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Abstract
Networked communications inherently depend on the ability of the
sender of a message to indicate through some token how the message
should be delivered to a particular recipient. The tokens that refer mes-
sages to recipients are variously known as routes, addresses, handles, and
names, ordered by their relative nearness to network topology vs. human
meaning. All four sorts of token refer in some way to a recipient, but
they are controlled by different authorities and their meanings depend on
different contextual parameters.
Today’s global Internet employs dynamically determined routes, IP
addresses, and domain names. Domain names combine the functions of
handles and names. The high value of domain names as names leads
to substantial social and legal dispute about their assignment, degrading
their value as handles. The time has come to provide a distinct open
network handle system (ONHS), using handles that are not meaningful in
natural language and are therefore not subject to the disputes surrounding
the use of names.
A handle service may be deployed easily as a handle domain within the
current Domain Name System. In order to minimize the administrative
load, and maximize their own autonomy, netizens may use public-key
cryptography to assign their own handles.
1 The Value of Names Leads to Conflict
The success of the Internet has made it valuable, and that value has naturally led
to conflict between contenders for the profits. Many parts of the Internet design
have avoided such conflict by providing a sufficient supply of valuable resources,
and by economic network effects that make one party’s holdings even more
valuable when others gain similar holdings. The assignment of high-level names
in the Domain Name System (DNS) stands out for the substantial and increasing
contention for scarce resources. There is some controversy over the extent to
which this scarcity should be cured by introduction of a large number of top-
level domains (TLDs). But to some substantial degree the conflict derives from
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the natural scarcity of human memory and attention, which often causes the
opposite of a network effect—other uses of my name can diminish the valuable
distinction of having that name refer to me.
Dispute over valuable names precedes the Internet, and led to legal regulation
of trade marks names. The sudden success of the Internet threw a monkey
wrench into that regulation by changing and blurring the boundaries between
the different contexts in which a name is used.
Long before highways were super, much less informational, Cyrus Avery
recognized the importance of naming when he promoted the development of
Route 66 through his hometown of Tulsa Oklahoma. Even after the Road
Designation Committee had agreed to construct pavement connecting Chicago,
Tulsa, and Los Angeles, Avery fought to have that route given a single name,
and the highly mnemonic name of Route 60. He settled for 66, which was
at least more mnemonic than 64 or 68. This naming coup established the
notion that people would travel from Chicago to Los Angeles through Tulsa,
enticed song-writers and television producers to advertise that notion for free,
and brought lots of tourist money to Oklahoma that would otherwise have
landed elsewhere [17]. The conflict over Internet domain names is the natural
successor to the conflict over road names, and it will not be completely resolved
as long as domain names have an impact on commercially valuable behavior.
While a certain amount of conflict over name space is probably unavoidable,
we should remove as much of the value of the Internet as we can from the scope
of that conflict. Domain names in the current DNS conflate two different sorts
of utility:
• they serve as permanent handles, referring to a particular agent as its
address changes due to mobility or to changes in network topology;
• they serve as mnemonic and guessable names, establishing a connection
between humanly meaningful concepts and network agents.
Meaningless handles are plentiful, and can be provided promiscuously without
suffering a reverse network effect. Names carry a very substantial structure of
meaning, which adds to their value, but also makes them much more problematic
and in particular attracts conflict.
So, we should separate these two sorts of utility, and support each one as
well as possible independently of the other. With such independence, conflict
over handles should be insignificantly small. Conflict over names will continue,
but the greater flexibility allowed by independent use of handles and names may
allow more effective management of names as well. If domain names cease to
be the only available network handles, they may compete more sensibly with
other semantic organization of the Internet, such as Yahoo and Google. Bob
Frankston wrote a very useful analysis of the way in which conflict over names
leads to violations of their use as handles, and the need for a “Safe Haven” for
handles [10].
Although I am only proposing to separate handles from names, I need to
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discuss the other two sorts of network reference tokens—routes and addresses—
and the parties that use them.
2 Parties to Network Operations
I derive the need for the four different sorts of tokens that may be used in
a network—routes, addresses, handles, and names—from the need to accom-
modate a number of different sorts of parties to network operations, each one
assigned different authority and responsibility, and each one feeling different
incentives. I derive my list of parties intuitively from my observations of the
global Internet. A different list of parties might demand a different design.
In this article, an agent is any entity in which we care to invest authority.
That includes human beings, offices performed by human beings, corporations,
departments within corporations, groups of human beings acting somewhat co-
operatively, computer programs, and lots of other possibilities. A document may
be thought of as a relatively passive agent, or the curator of a document may
be treated as a different agent when acting as curator than when performing
other roles.
Parties in network operations include:
Routers: Agents that read information in a message somehow indicating the
desired recipient, and direct the message in order to reach that recipient.
Today, the word “router” often refers to a particular sort of network hard-
ware designed especially to serve as a router. But all “hosts” in Internet
terminology are also routers. For the purpose of my conceptual overview,
a router may also be a particular piece of software running on a com-
puter host, or any other identifiable agent that participates in routing. A
network system normally includes a large number of routers.
Network administration: The unique collective agent that determines the
rules by which a network system operates. Network administration is nor-
mally a loose organization comprising a variety of computers, individuals,
and participating organizations with different detailed incentives. But to
the extent that they all co-operate in the interest of effective network
operation, I regard them as constituting a single collective agent.
Members: All agents that send and receive messages across the network.
Communities: Loosely co-operating groups of people.
A particular agent may participate in the network in more than one of the
roles above, or as a member of a larger agent, but I derive my observations
about reference tokens from the separate actions of agents in their different
roles. Notice again that there are lots of routers, lots of members, and lots of
communities, each constituting an individual agent. There is only one network
administration, although it is a large collective agent.
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3 Routes, Addresses, Handles, and Names
I will define these four types of tokens in terms of the operations that we can
perform on them. But you might notice that in most cases we can translate
between the four types of tokens, so mathematically whatever we can do to
one we can do to the others. The real differences lie in which operations must
be very efficient, and in who has the authority to determine the translations.
Translation from names to handles to addresses to routes is called resolution.
Route: A token associated with a message directing routers how to deliver that
message.
Address: A token associated with a particular target location in a network.
At any location in the network (not just the target location), an address
should resolve to a route leading to the target location.
Handle: A token associated with an agent participating in a network. A handle
should resolve to an address at which we may communicate with that
agent.
Name: A token carrying some humanly understandable meaning. A name
should resolve to the handle corresponding to its humanly understandable
meaning.
I use the word “should” advisedly in these definitions. A network system is
intended to support the resolution of names to handles to addresses to routes in
a fashion that satisfies all of the “should”s. But the requirements for resolution
of names is inherently subjective, so the resolution cannot be perfectly reliable.
As we go down the list from names toward routes, the objective quality and
reliability of resolution improves, but it never becomes perfect. The success of
the global Internet depends critically on our willingness to work with protocols
that should produce a particular result, but that fail occasionally. We have found
that it is better in many cases to guard against the consequences of occasional
failures than to try to prevent them.
In this article, I am trying to show the value of including all four levels
of reference, and all three resolution steps, in the design of a network. But
many network designs reduce the number of levels to three, two, or even one by
omitting levels and/or conflating adjacent levels. I am not aware of any network
design in serious use today that includes all four levels and keeps them clearly
separate. When a level is missing, resolution just skips over that level to the
next lower one (nearer to routes) that is included in the design.
By composing the different resolution steps, all network reference tokens re-
solve down to routes. In many cases, we can also run resolution backwards (e.g.,
the current whois service maps IP addresses back to domain names that resolve
to them). The relative ease with which each type of token may be mapped to
each other type makes it hard to keep track of the differences. Whenever the
support for a particular type of token is missing, we tend to use another type
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of token to approximate it. For example, the English phrase “Editor of the
Journal of Irreproducible Results” is a name that also works pretty well outside
of the network as a handle, referring continuously to the abstract agent who
edits JIR no matter how that role passes from person to person and how the
people playing the role move from one address to another. But I regard such a
phrase as essentially a name, since its resolution is mediated by natural human
language, and subject to changes in that language.
In the definitions above, I differentiated addresses, handles, and names ac-
cording to the different objects that they should refer to consistently, even while
the routes change. An address should always refer to the same location, a handle
to the same agent, and a name to the same humanly understandable meaning.
The meaning of a name is clearly subjective, but in fact the notions of loca-
tion and agent are also fuzzy. Instead of refining the definitions of location
and agent, which I am pretty sure can never be made satisfactorily objective, I
will distinguish addresses, handles, and names according to where we invest the
authority for their resolutions. In effect, this means that a network location is
whatever address resolution defines it to be, a network agent is whatever handle
resolution defines it to be, and meaning is whatever natural language defines it
to be.
Address to route: Network administration has authority over all resolutions
of addresses to routes. In practice, the network administration as a whole
usually delegates some of this authority to smaller agents participating in
the network administration.
Handle to address: Each member of the network may become owner of one
or more handles. The owner of a handle has authority over all resolutions
of that handle to an address. Network administration may have authority
to assign handles to owners.
Name to handle: Human communities have collective authority over the res-
olution of names to handles.
The intention in the assignment of authority above is to make the authority
over a resource, the responsibility for acceptable use of that resource, and the
incentive to derive value from the resource, coincide as much as possible. If
I have identified the types of parties well, and matched the resources to them
well, then these authorities, responsibilities, and incentives will coincide well.
To understand the relations between the three types of resolution, consider
the ways in which each type of resolution can vary. All three vary over time, to
deal with mobility on the network, changes in jargon, etc. But at a given time,
they vary differently according to context within and without the network.
Address to route: Resolution varies according to starting location in the net-
work, so that the ending location is constant.
Handle to address: Resolution does not vary except over time.
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routes handles names
network
administration
addresses
individual
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#437
netbotGrampa
Bizco, Inc.
network
locations agents meaningsdeliveries
communities
Figure 1: System of parties, reference tokens, and referents.
Name to handle: Resolution varies according to linguistic context, local dif-
ferences in language and culture, and anything that affects the way people
think.
Roughly, address→route resolution varies within the network, handle→address
resolution doesn’t vary at all, and name→handle resolution varies outside the
network.
4 The System of Parties and Reference Tokens
The considerations above suggest a system of parties and reference tokens with
the structure shown in Figure 1.
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• The items in blue rounded rectangular boxes on the top row represent
the three types of parties with authority over resolution—a single network
administration, any number of individual network members, and any num-
ber of overlapping human communities. These parties are abstract agents
who participate in the network, but the network design doesn’t define
them precisely and formally.
• The items in black square boxes in the middle row represent the four types
of reference tokens. These types of tokens must be given explicitly and
formally in the network design.
• The items in gold ovals in the bottom row represent the types of mental
concepts that the four types of reference tokens are intended to capture.
The act of message delivery in the network is rather precisely defined, but
moving from left to right, the concepts become less objective and more
ambiguous, as suggested by the fuzzier sorts of boundaries.
• The red lines from the top to the middle row represent the authority of
the three types of parties to control the three types of resolution. The
multiple connections from individual members to arrows from handles to
addresses indicate that each handle owner has separate authority over her
handle(s). The squiggly red lines from communities to the name→handle
resolution suggest the complexity of their collective exercise of authority.
• The black right-left arrows in the middle row represent the three types of
resolution. These methods of resolution are implemented through some
sort of tables in various network hosts and routers.
• The gold left-right arrows in the bottom row represent the conceptual
connections that allow each of these concepts to determine one to its
right. Each delivery leads to a particular location. Each location contains
a particular agent. Each agent is responsible for data or services with a
particular human meaning.
• The green up-down arrows between the middle and bottom rows repre-
sent the intended associations of deliveries with routes, locations with ad-
dresses, agents with handles, and meanings with names. The association
of routes with deliveries is determined precisely and formally by the net-
work operations. From left to right, the associations become less objective
and more ambiguous, as suggested by the fuzzier sorts of arrows.
The design and implementation of a system of network reference tokens is in-
tended to make all of the different paths from formal network tokens (black) to
mental concepts (gold) connect the same individual items. In particular, when
we resolve a particular handle into an address and then into a route, then use
that route to deliver a message to a location, the agent receiving the message at
that location is intended to be the one associated conceptually with the given
handle. As network architects and engineers, we can only control the mecha-
nisms for the black arrows. A design and implementation are successful if they
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make the black resolution arrows work in such a way that it is possible (with
high reliability, but not absolute perfection) to think up sensible conceptual in-
terpretations of the green and gold arrows that make these different connections
equivalent.
Notice that there is no fixed definitional foundation in the diagram. The
behavior of the network, as determined by the formal settings of resolutions in
the middle row (black), influences the way that we think about the concepts in
the bottom row (gold). The success of the system is determined by the utility
of its entire behavior, not by the agreement of one part of the diagram with a
completely predetermined structure in another.
There are a lot of details involved in making such a system of names, han-
dles, addresses, and routes work efficiently. For example, although each party
should keep a table of the resolutions directly under its authority, and that
table should be the final resort to resolve tokens correctly, all sorts of routers
and other agents should keep local tables, called caches, of the resolutions that
they are using regularly, to save the traffic and the delay associated with send-
ing to the authoritative source for each resolution. Furthermore, local caches
don’t necessarily correspond directly to address→route, handle→address, and
name→handle resolution. If a particular agent is concerned with the corre-
spondence between names and addresses, it should cache a table of the direct
resolution of names to addresses, derived by composing the name→handle and
handle→address resolutions. With this sort of transitive caching, the cost of
multilevel resolution is not much more than one-level resolution.
4.1 Routes, Addresses, and Handlenames in the Current
Internet
Routes. In the current Internet, routes do not need to be written down in one
place. address→route resolution interleaves with the execution of a delivery, so
that the route is implicit in the path by which a message is forwarded. The
relationship between IP addresses and routes is a bit more complicated than
this article suggests, since several different routes to the same address may be
used at the same time, and messages may be broken up en route and reassembled
at the end.
Addresses. The IP routing protocol is described in a form that uses IP num-
bers as addresses. IP numbers are just 32-bit numbers. But IP numbers are
not the only sorts of addresses used in the Internet. The UDP protocol uses
the combination of an IP number and a port number as an extended address.
IP numbers essentially allow a message to be addressed to an entire computer,
called a host (although for technical reasons IP numbers actually refer to net-
work interfaces). UDP addresses allow a message to be addressed to a particular
application running on a particular host, such as a particular sort of server, or
a mail recipient. Other protocols have other notions of address—the HTTP
protocol supporting the World Wide Web uses URLs as addresses. A URL
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essentially addresses a particular file on a particular host.
Networking efficiency sometimes requires addresses of distributed locations
for servers requiring the resources of several hosts. For example multihosted
Web servers share the messages to a particular address among several different
hosts. As far as I know, most addresses for distributed locations on the cur-
rent Internet are simulated implicitly through some tricks with routing tables
(IPv6 [11] has addresses for multicast and anycast distributed locations). Mo-
bility and intermittent connection call for time-dependent addresses. For the
future, we should open our minds to the possibility that any sort of instructions
for contacting a particular agent may be thought of as an address.
Handlenames. The Domain Name System [14, 15] (DNS) provides tokens
that were mainly designed to serve as handles. But domain names are usually
chosen to be mnemonically valuable sequences of characters, so they also serve
as names. The high value of the names creates conflicts that degrade the value
as handles.
5 A Pseudohistory of Network Reference
One way to understand the value of the four layers of reference to the effective
use of a network is to consider a partly fictional, but realistic, history of network
development as it might have happened.
First came routes. A network cannot deliver messages without routes. The
UUCP system directed all messages by routes of the form host1!host2. . . !hostn,
describing the entire sequence of “hosts” (acting as routers in my terminology)
on the route. Each host/router kept its own table of hosts/routers with which it
communicated directly. System administration required little more than agree-
ing on the general format for describing routes—all operational routing details
could be handled independently by hosts/routers.
Routes allowed great support for distributed routing, but they were not
portable. If Sally at the host gargoyle discovered the route to a great online
candy store run by Grampa, and wished to share it with her friend Paul at
foghorn, she could not merely send the route token to Paul—someone had to
translate the route. The only general and reliable way for Sally and Paul to
translate the route was to append the route between foghorn and gargoyle,
which they must have known in order to communicate. This led to nasty long
routes with inefficient forwarding. Even if Sally were selfish, and kept the candy
supply to herself, she had to translate the route when she moved from gargoyle
to juniper. Worse, selfish Sally could rest immobile at gargoyle and still find
that a change in network topology invalidated her treasured route to Grampa’s
candy.
Addresses provide independence of starting point and topology. In
small local networks, with all participants connected rigidly and directly, routes
9
are pretty much indistinguishable from addresses. The design of IP for ARPANet
and the Internet made useful sense of globally meaningful addresses in a dynam-
ically changing network with many different sorts of hops between particular
communicating hosts. Addresses in IP were just 32-bit numbers, but they were
usually written in the form n1.n2.n3.n4, where n1, n2, n3, n4 are 8-bit numbers
written in base 10.
Network administration had authority to assign these numbers, but it could
delegate the authority to assign numbers within a subrange. Each host/router
kept track of its own address, the addresses of hosts/routers with which it
communicated directly, and the direction in which to forward a message with
each possible address. Since 232 =4,294,967,296 was somewhat too large to
allow each host/router to store a table with a separate entry for each possible
address, routing tables held entries forwarding all addresses in some numerical
range in the same direction, and providing a default direction for addresses not
in the table.
IP routing provided global addresses, whose meanings would not change
according to the location from which they are used. This allowed Sally to keep
track of Grampa’s candy store, and share it with Paul at will. It takes some
thought to make sure that the routing could work efficiently, but real history
shows that it did.
IP routing never required anyone to resolve an address into an explicitly
written token presenting the route. Routes were implicit in the joint distributed
actions of all of the hosts/routers. In effect, the resolution of an address to a
route was interleaved with delivery according to the route. But routes were still
there. Those who really wanted to write them down could generally get them
from the traceroute program.
With IP addresses to pass around, Sally, Paul, and Grampa were all quite
happy, until the candy store’s address changed. The address changed once
because Grampa moved his server from space rented on a shared computer to
his own computer, once because he moved the store to another state with lower
business taxes, and several other times because network topology changed. Even
though IP numerical addresses were not tied rigidly to routes, they had to be
assigned so that the routing tables could keep information efficiently in terms
of a small number of numerical subranges, forwarding all addresses within such
a subrange in the same direction. Both the candy store’s own mobility, and the
requirement to maintain efficient routing through a change in network topology,
prevented Grampa’s initial IP address from sticking reliably to the candy store.
DNS provided handlenames. The designers of the Internet realized very
early that effective use of the network required the ability to refer permanently
and reliably to an agent whose address might change. So, they invented domain
names of the form bottomdomain.subdomain. . . .topdomain to serve as perma-
nent handles. Network administration had authority to assign domain names,
but it could delegate that authority hierarchically even more flexibly than the
authority over IP addresses. Network administration maintained tables trans-
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lating domains to addresses. But only the translation of top-level domains (edu,
com, org, etc.), which appear at the right-hand end of complete domain names,
needed to be available globally. Each top-level domain name could resolve to the
address of a server keeping tables for that domain only, and so on down the hier-
archy. Furthermore, each individual host could maintain its own local cache of
recently or frequently used domain name translations, avoiding repeated appeal
to the authoritative name servers.
With domain names, Grampa could acquire ydnac.com (to avoid collision
with reality, a certain word is written backwards), and subdivide the business
into chocolate.ydnac.com, halvah.ydnac.com, etc. at will. Sally could keep
track of ydnac.com, and perhaps her favorite subdomains, use these domain
names from any host on the network, communicate them to Paul at will. Fur-
thermore, whenever his own mobility, or a change in network topology, caused
the address of the candy store to change, Grampa could merely update the entry
for ydnac.com in the appropriate authoritative table, and let it spread around
to all of the local caches.
In the story so far, domain names have served as handles, providing per-
manent reference to an agent through changes of address. But Grampa, and
all of his actual and potential customers, got a big bonus as well. The domain
name ydnac.com served as a humanly-meaningful name. Sally and Paul found
ydnac.com fairly easy to remember, type in their emails to one another, spell
out over the telephone, and even to guess at before they knew of the candy store
or whenever they lost their record of its name. Even had it been permanent, a
numerical IP address would not have been so convenient.
Conflict about names destroys handles. Unfortunately, the very knowl-
edge of the humanly-meaningful semantics associated with ydnac.com, giving
it value as a name, became incompatible with its function as a handle. A num-
ber of larger and more powerful candy companies, as well as the multinational
corporation C and Y, all claimed rights to ydnac.com, and it was taken away
from Grampa. The bonus value of ydnac.com as a name led to administrative
action violating its use as a handle [10].
It is tempting to blame those nasty big companies for stomping on Grampa,
but in fact, humanly meaningful names are inherently subject to forces beyond
the authority of an individual handle owner. Human meaning, by definition, is
determined by human communities. An individual may determine the human
meaning of a name among a circle of friends who accept his influence. But it
is fundamentally infeasible to keep human meaning in line with the arbitrary
exercise of authority that we would like to invest in the owner of a handle. No
matter how cleverly we assign names to start with, some change in society will
ruin the scheme.
We can invest a lot of effort into improving the fairness with which conflict
over domain names is resolved, and supply more and more domain names to
trade off mnemonic quality against cost. But Grampa’s ownership of ydnac.com
is inherently a lucky and unsustainable windfall, which we cannot provide to
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everybody who wants it. Whatever contest we set up, only the winner of that
contest may have it.
Separate handles from names. At this point, our story ceases to be history
and becomes planning. If we cannot avoid conflict over network names, perhaps
we can at least provide conflict-free permanent handles. By locating a system
of handles without human meaning at a level of abstraction between names and
addresses, we can provide Sally, Paul, and other lovers of grandfatherly candy
with a permanent token by which they may reach Grampa as long as he cares
to respond to it. We can’t help Grampa and his customers hold on to the
wonderful mnemonic value of ydnac.com, but they can’t keep that anyway, and
it’s better to keep the handle than to fight a losing battle for the name and keep
nothing. ydnac.com is inherently one of a very small number of short memorable
names that naturally suggest online acquisition of sweets to all English-speaking
Internet users, and we can’t give everyone with an interest in candy full authority
over it—we should expect it to go to the strongest contender.
Without ydnac.com, how will Grampa attract attention to his business?
The same way he always did before his unsustainable domain-name windfall.
Although Grampa’s candy handle is opaque and unmemorable, friends and sat-
isfied customers will pass copies of it around, using Web browsers and other soft-
ware that will cater to users’ needs to keep track of unmemorable handles. In a
pinch, they will read it off to one another as, say, a 16-digit hexadecimal number
(similar to a 16-digit credit card number). The handle will appear behind the
scenes in pointers, such as the links in Web pages and their technical successors.
People will keep personal directories that resolve “My favorite candy store” to
Grampa’s candy handle. Grampa will advertise in venues that match his natural
clientele and advertising budget, and those venues will associate his handle lo-
cally with humanly meaningful words, pictures, and other tokens, since he can’t
afford to acquire and defend a global association. Aggressive indexing services,
such as the current Yahoo and Google, will organize Grampa’s candy handle
into their own presentations of the informational structure of the Web and its
technical successors. And, as long as global domain names last, Grampa can still
choose to fight for ydnac.com, or make a strategic retreat to grampasydnac.com,
or fall back further to grampasydnaconmainstreetintinytownusaearthsolarsystem.com,
or . . . . But I think that, in the long run, he will get more satisfaction from the
alternatives.
6 Implementing Handles as Domain Names
Since DNS was designed largely to support network handles, no large software
development or deployment is required to support an open network handle sys-
tem. We merely need a nice sponsor to provide a handle domain within the
current system of domain names, such as handleroot.nicesponsor.org, and
provide random-looking numerical handles promiscuously to all who ask for
them. For example, if we choose to present handles in base 16, a typical handle
12
might look like h0061A38F9A3540B9. This handle may be implemented un-
der DNS as h0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.nicesponsor.org. There is no
particular need for the root of the handle system to be a top-level domain in
DNS. Handle owners may define subdomains below their handles with complete
freedom, as domain owners do today.
The main administrative burden on the sponsor of an open network handle
system is the authentication of updates to the handle→address resolution tables.
Because an individual handle has almost no intrinsic value beyond that created
by the owner at the assigned address, there is no need to identify handle owners
reliably with a person or institution in the real world. It is only important to
minimize accidental and malicious capture of handles after they are assigned
and used. To avoid being a party to disputes, the sponsor should minimize its
contact with handle owners.
The precise design of the authentication mechanism should be allowed to
vary. The sponsor may offer handle owners some choice to trade off authentica-
tion overhead against security, depending on owners’ resources and the value of
a particular handle. So, in general a handle might look like h<t><p1>...<pn>,
where <t> indicates the type of authentication used for handle updates, and
<p1>...<pn> are parameters of that method, including the unique handle key.
A complete design of ONHS will allow a user to
• create a new handle;
• (re)assign an address temporarily to a handle;
• delegate a handle temporarily to another handle, possibly with a different
owner;
• cancel a handle irrevocably;
• transfer a handle irrevocably to another handle, usually with a different
authentication key;
• mark a handle’s security irrevocably as compromised.
Typical scenarios using these operations to support creation of handle hierar-
chies, conversion to new authentication methods, and transfer of handles con-
nected with sale of a business, are treated in [16].
7 Self-Assigned Cryptographic Handles
In order to ease the sponsor’s administrative burden and potential liability
as much as possible, ONHS should ideally allow completely independent self-
assignment of handles. Such self-assignment is feasible in principle, using public-
key cryptographic signatures. Any user may create a public/private key pair,
and assign herself a handle of the form h1g5k<key>, where “h” just reminds
us that this is a handle (and satisfies DNS’ requirement to start with an al-
phabetic character), “1” indicates a public-key handle, “g” introduces a code
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for the encryption algorithm, “5” is the IANA standard number [4] for the
RSA/SHA1 signature algorithm. Finally, <key> is some number of hexadecimal
digits from the end of the SHA1 [5] hash of an RSA [12] public key. 16 digits
will probably provide plenty of assurance against accidental or malicious colli-
sion of handles. We may allow individual handle owners to choose the tradeoff
between length and security. Ignoring the fact that I haven’t used an actual
RSA/SHA1 key, the whole embedding of a self-assigned handle in DNS might
look like h1g5k0061A38F9A3540B9.handleroot.nicesponsor.org.
The security extensions to DNS (DNSSEC) [6] already implement almost all
of the functions required to support self-assigned keys based on RSA/SHA1 [16].
In a system of self-assigned handles, there is no need to invest any authority
over resolution in the operator of a name server. A user who queries a handle
may authenticate the handle with the owner at the resolvent address. Since
the identity of the public key is embedded in the handle itself, as long as the
particular key and signature algorithm are not compromised, no intermediary
can defraud a conscientious querier. The operator of a name server becomes
a mere facilitator of the contact between querier and handle owner, with all
responsibility for the authenticity of the contact left to the parties most con-
cerned. The system provides a lot of flexibility for individual handle owners and
queriers to contract with operators to provide a defined level of service, without
affecting authenticity of communications. [16] describes potential attacks on a
self-assigned ONHS in more detail.
7.1 Digression on Public-Key Cryptography
The embedding of (hash keys for) public cryptographic keys has occurred to a
number of people. The Open Privacy Initiative uses it to create nyms as the ba-
sis for the accumulation of reputations [13]. Carl M. Ellison mentioned the use
of hashed public keys as self-assigned identifiers [8]. Ronald Rivest and Butler
Lampson use the same basic idea in their Simple Distributed Security Infras-
tructure project [18]. Daniel J. Bernstein pointed out the value of hostnames
that match public keys [3]. Scott Nelson explained the present application to
ONHS in a private communication.
The development of the idea of signatures as objects is well worth considering
as a tangent. At first, public-key cryptography appears to solve the digital
signature problem. On reflection, we see that it reduces the digital signature
problem to the key management problem. The secret key appears to be the
harder one to manage. But it only needs to be kept by its owner, who has a
substantial incentive to guard it well, and who may limit the number of secret
keys that she manages. Management of public keys is often the bigger problem.
Each key must be published, and somehow the user of the key must be assured
of the connection between that key and a particular agent. The dominant idea
to establish that connection is a chain of trust in which we all store public keys
for a small number of globally trusted agents, who sign certificates of subagents,
who sign certificates of more subagents, and so on. Such a chain is no stronger
than its weakest link, and the establishment of satisfactory roots is already very
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difficult.
I know of no simple solution to the problem of secret-key management. But
we may finesse much of the problem of public-key management by letting keys
themselves be identities. In effect, public-key handles, nyms, and similar objects
do not try to solve the problem of identification on the network. Rather, they
serve as tools for constructing identities on the network. They link together all
of our transactions with those identities in a reasonably reliable way, and allow
us to develop a sense of confidence (or lack of it) from a sequence of transactions.
We may use contacts outside of the network, and network communications with
agents whom we already know and trust, to increase our confidence in the owner
of a particular handle. But the handle itself does not provide any authentic
identification deeper than “the owner of this handle.”
So, we may characterize the value of ONHS with a slogan: it provides conti-
nuity, not authenticity. Mere continuity appears to have modest value, but when
available cheaply and reliably it may be the foundation on which we construct
more valuable qualities, such as authenticity.
8 Call to Action
Problems with robust reference to resources on the Internet are widely recog-
nized. They are currently being addressed by a variety of ambitious and poten-
tially valuable projects, including the development of governance systems for
DNS by ICANN, Tim Berners-Lee’s Semantic Web [2], and the INET working
groups on Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) [19] and Uniform Resource Names
(URN) [20]. All of these projects are wrestling directly with human meaning in
some form, and all have the potential to add a lot of value to network operations.
But all of them are dealing with unsolved problems that preclude immediate
wide deployment.
The Permanent URL (PURL) service of OCLC [21] offers free handles in
the URL name space, providing an immediate useful solution to the problem of
permanent reference to documents and services that wander around the Web.
They are assigning meaningful names on a first-come-first-served basis, which
exposes them to the same sorts of dispute that plague DNS if their success
attracts the wrong sort of attention. And the service only applies to URL
addresses.
The time is ripe for an open network handle system, operating as a domain
within DNS, to offer meaningless numerical handles freely and promiscuously to
all who ask. Handles that resolve to IP numbers provide a particularly strategic
level of service at the foundation of Internet addressing. Future expansion to
higher-level addresses, including UDP addresses, URLs, and more, is valuable,
but should not delay the implementation of resolution to IP numbers.
The cost of operating the name server will be comparable to the cost of
operating a single DNS root server. If the service is successful, there will be a
sufficient incentive for the community to provide additional servers to share the
load.
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If the quality of implementations of DNSSEC is deemed sufficient, the ONHS
should support RSA/SHA1 self-assigned handles. For users who are not ready
to deal with private-key management, there should be a password-authenticated
procsy service to generate and hold private keys. It is also possible to provide
a service assigning random handles with only password authentication. This
should be the fall-back if DNSSEC implementation is not sufficiently advanced,
but the sponsor of ONHS service should encourage migration to owner-managed
keys as soon as possible, to avoid legal responsibility for keys.
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